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James C Moore II 
C Eric Hager 
Drugs and Crime: 
A Bad Connection? 
After this article went to press, the United State Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a 
massive (253 pages) set of opinions in United States v. 
Moore, No. 71-1252 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 1973), one of the 
cases discussed below. By a 5-4 vote, the court affirmed 
appellant's convictions for possession of heroin and 
remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration 
of the sentence. There were two opinions within the 
majority bloc of judges. Judge Wilkey, joined by Judges 
MacKinnon and Robb, contended that allowing drug 
dependence as a defense to a possession charge would 
create the strong-and in his view disturbing-possibility 
that the dependence defense would be extended to all other 
crimes. 
Introduction 
What to do about the "drug problem" is a 
question of intense general and professional concern. Most 
people are worried about the illicit drugs, particularly 
heroin, rather than the widely used legal drugs, such as 
alcohol. 1 Out of the many reasons for the public furor and 
occasional near hysteria that mark debates about drug 
control policies, two explanations appear most frequently. 
The first is the widely held belief that drugs cause crime. 
The second is a moral objection to the perceived self-
indulgence of pleasure-seeking drug takers, an objection 
most strikingly voiced about marijuana use but also 
directed at other illicit drugs. 2 
Section I of this article explores the basic 
"drugs-crime" assumption upon which so much public 
policy and criminal law have been built. No one can 
determine accurately how substantial the connection is 
between present patterns of drug use and the nature and 
extent of crime, 3 but there are two distinct questions to 
consider. First, how much of the total crime is committed 
by drug users? Secondly, and more importantly, would 
drug users who commit crimes do so even if they are not 
using drugs? For example, it may be that most heroin users 
commit crimes before the onset of heroin use, with their 
Judge Leventhal, joined by Judge McGowan, participation in the illicit drug "scene" merely being an 
deferred to congressional expertise in the drug field while __ added facet of their anti-social behavior. The particular 
indicating a degree of philosophical affinity with appellant's pattern of crime may change after the onset of heroin use, 
arguments. but heroin use, in itself, and any underlying propensity to 
In dissent, Judge Wright, joined by Chief Judge commit crime may not be related at all. Heroin may simply 
Bazelon and Judges Tamm and Robinson, discussed at great be the luxury commodity of choice for many persons who 
length the history of drug use in various cultures, the wish to spend their disposable income-however obtained-
history of American drug control laws, and present on an expensive good that offers a certain amount of 
knowledge and theories of drug dependence. Judge Wright's pleasure, relief, or escape. Along with other psychoactive 
opinion accepts most of the arguments advanced by the drugs, it may be an economic and medical example of 
appellant, as outlined in this article. "conspicuous consumption," undeserving of the attention 
paid to it by the criminal law. 
Section II examines the "drugs-crime" 
assumption as written into recent drug control bills 
increasing the penalties for crimes committed under the 
influence of drugs, that would create a presumption that 
drug use before commission of a crime caused the 
perpetrator to commit the crime.4 This proposed statutory 
presumption is the most direct expression of the assumed 
"drugs-crime" connection. It is not, however, the only 
recent example of legislative concern with drugs and crime. 
Proposals in New York5 and in Congress 6 , for example, call 
for high mandatory minimum sentences for drug sales, with 
severe restrictions on plea bargaining, suspended sentences, 
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229 probation and parole. These proposals are worthy of 
extended discussion. They are not discussed here, however, 
because of space limitations and because the ingestion-
causes-crime presumption most forcefully articulates the 
commonly-held assumptions regarding wanton drug users 
preying on the citizenry. 
Section III raises constitutional questions about 
the laws against mere possession of dru~, laws that best 
represent the prevailing moral judgment that drug use is a 
vice to be punished. Public policy makers should begin to 
ask whether drug use that at most harms only the user 
should be interfered with or controlled any more than 
should overeating or other common activities that may 
harm an individual. 
Some general comments on the authors' 
perception of the current drug "scene" will, they hope, set 
the framework for the formal discussions that follow. 
Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of the entire "drug 
problem" is the unwillingness of most policy makers to 
look at past unsuccessful efforts to control or eliminate 
dru~. As thoughtful scholars 7 and long-time participants in 
drug law debates8 have repeatedly pointed out, harsh drug 
control laws against selling and possession-including 
minimum sentences, denial of probation and parole, and 
other punitive ingredients-have never succeeded in 
reducing substantially the availability or use of mind-
altering dru~.9 
American policy makers in 1973 cannot 
continue to base drug control policies upon the accumula-
ted misinformation of over half a century. What good 
information is available should be studied carefully by 
people who make laws and people who enforce them before 
promises are made to a confused and increasingly cynical 
public that the next round of harsh penalties will enable us 
to see the light at the end of the tunnel of drug abuse and 
crime. The proper questions are only now being asked, and, 
pending study of them, policy makers should avoid 
timeworn schemes that have failed in the past. 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence that 
influential decision-makers and planners are thinking deeply 
about the course of American drug control policies. Several 
well-researched, dispassionate books on dru~ and drug 
policies have appeared in recent years, 10 but the level of 
the public discussions emanating from high places scarcely 
reflects our current knowledge. 
The most recent statement by the federal 
government on drugs is Federal Strategy for Drug Abuse 
and Drug Traffic Prevention 1973, 11 an equivocal, often 
superficial document prepared under the direction of the 
President's drug planning office, the Special Action Office 
for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP). The Federal 
Strategy is not without well thought out passages, 12 but 
much of it simply reiterates questionable assumptions that 
most thoughtful observers are challenging. 
Rather than probing some of the difficult and 
sensitive problems of drug control, the Federal Strategy 
does little more than offer a defense of expanded "treat-
ment" 13 efforts, particularly the substitution of metha-
done for heroin. At several points, the report issues a 
thinly-veiled warning that drug users, including experi-
menters, will soon either choose treatment "voluntarily" or 
face involuntary treatment 14 or stiff penalties for criminal 
behavior. 15 
A few days before the Federal Strategy was 
released; Drug Use in America 16 was published by the 
congressionally-established National Commission on 
Marijuana and Drug Abuse. It is a thoughtful book, 17 and 
the several hundred pages of "technical papers" to be 
released within the next few months should be a rich source 
of drug data. A few observations from the book show how 
sensitive its authors were to the complex philosophical 
questions that underlie debates about drug control policies. 
In discussinft what it unflatteringly terms the "cult of 
curability" 8 that has created pressures for "treating" 
perceived drug ''addicts" even if they don't want assistance, 
Drug Use in America properly recognizes that" ... the 
drug user is but one of an increasing number of classes over 
whom society asserts control, not to hold them accountable 
for what they have done, but to modify their status." 19 In 
the drug field, we may be creating what already exists in 
the mental health area: the "therapeutic state," 20 based, in 
this case, upon an uncertain connection between drug use 
and crime, that in turn owes much to the belief that drug 
users are not harmless deviants but are, on the contrary, 
seriously ill and in need of outside help. 21 
Within the last five years a gigantic "drug abuse 
industrial complex" 22 has developed in the United 
States. 23 There is no indication that its rapid growth will 
be curtailed. Is it not time for those who have created and 
funded this drug complex to examine the premises upon 
which so much time and money are being expended? The 
questioning should begin with the relation between drug 
use and criminal behavior. 
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1 Drugs and Crime 
The Public Mood 
Public officials and most Americans are 
impatient and frustrated about the level of crime in our 
large cities. A readily identifiable villain-the driven heroin 
addict 24 -is often blamed for this seemingly irremediable 
situation. The general perception of the drug "addict" as 
the victim of uncontrollable physiological craving has until 
recently been reinforced by much "expert" opinion. Over 
the decades public officials have consistently blamed over 
one-half of urban crime on drug users. 25 The image of the 
shadowy, unscrupulous "pusher" hanging around 
schoolyards trapping upright, youthful citizens into an 
unwilling life of crime, persists. Because heroin is of most 
concern to citizens and policy makers, the authors 
concentrate their attention on the drug's relation to crime. 
However, it is not our only drug "problem" and indeed ' 
may be less in tractable than other drug problems such as 
alcoholism and poly-drug use. 
In his March 14, 1973, Message to Congress, 
President Nixon referred to drugs as "'public enemy 
number one,' destroying the most precious resource we 
have-our young people-and breeding lawlessness, violence 
and death." 26 In the findings accompanying the Drug 
Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, 27 Congress 
declared that " ... Drug Abuse, especially heroin addiction, 
substantially contributes to crime." In testimony before the 
Codes Committees of the New York State Assembly and 
Senate on behalf of his recently proposed bill providing life 
sentences for any transfer of drugs, 28 Governor Rockefeller 
urged passage to protect "the tens of thousands of innocent 
victims of our community who are robbed, mugged and 
murdered by those addicted who have to get the money to 
support their habit." 29 The New York legislators apparent~ 
Iy also believe that much crime is caused by addicts stealing 
to support their habits. The New York Mental Hygiene 
Law, which established a program of compulsory treatment 
for heavy drug users, states that "[n]arcotic addicts are 
estimated to be responsible for one-half the crimes 
committed in the city of New York alone .... " 30 In 
discussing one of the recently proposed amendments to the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
which would reintroduce mandatory minimum sentences 
for "non-addicts" convicted of selling heroin or mor-
phine, 31 one senior United States Senator remarked: 
This section is aimed at getting the cold-
blooded, calculating pusher of narcotics who 
preys on the youth of our country for greed 
and avarice alone, and commits them to a life 
of crime. 32 
Americans in general seem to agree with the 
viewpoint quoted above. The National Commission on 
Marihuana and Drug Abuse found that more than 90% of 
the youth and adults it questioned believed that heroin 
users often commit crimes they would not otherwise 
commit to get the money to buy more heroin. 33 The 
Commission concluded that these beliefs were grounded in 
the public's experience with personal and property crime. 34 
Legislative proposals aimed at reducing crime 
by increasing the penalties connected with drug use are 
gaining favor. There is evidence, however, which suggests 
that policies directed at drug habits will have only a slight 
impact on criminal activity. The real possibility that 
eliminating drug use, particularly heroin use, would not 
reduce crime seriously weakens the foundation upon which 
such policies rest. 
What Do We Know 
About Drugs and Crime? 
The fundamental problem with learning about 
drug related crime is the lack of adequate data from which 
to draw conclusions. Sociologist Jerry Mandel in a 
thoughtful 1969 article 35 concluded that the lack of 
sophistication and low quality of official data are attribu-
table to the use of inconsistent criteria for drug arrests and 
seizures, failure to differentiate among drugs, changes in 
drug laws, changes in judicial attitudes toward drug offenses 
and changes in the resource capacities of various law 
enforcement agencies. 36 Even absent these shortcomings, 
the data are fundamentally inadequate because they 
measure only drug arrests and convictions and quantities of 
drugs seized, not the more significant information on the 
extent, frequency and quantity of drug use in the 
market. 37 
As a rule, "addicts" are identified only through 
death, arrest or enrollment in treatment programs. The 
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention stated in 
its report to the President that, while no entirely satis-
factory method exists for estimating the number of heroin 
"addicts" in the United States, in 1972 there were an 
estimated 500,000-600,000 "addicts" and users. 38 As of 
December 31, 1972, the federal Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs estimated the number of "abusers of 
narcotics" to be 559,224. 39 Because the raw data about 
the number of heroin users are so questionable, and because 
many crimes may go unreported, 40 it is not presently 
possible, for these reasons alone, to determine accurately 
the number of individuals who commit crimes solely to 
purchase heroin. 
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231 Ascertaining the number of heroin users would 
leave important questions still unanswered. The degree of 
dependence upon heroin presumably contributes to the 
user's need to engage in criminal behavior-the bigger the 
habit, the more money he must have to sustain it. But such 
a relationship is very difficult to prove. Testing procedures 
such as urinalysis cannot gauge degrees of dependence 
accurately. The degree of physical dependence can now be 
measured only by the severity of the withdrawal syn-
drome. 41 Contrary to popular perception, all heroin users 
are not heroin dependent but there is not statistical 
information to identify the per cent of those who are 
"chippers"-those who use heroin only occasionally, are 
not addicted or dependent, and do not commit crimes to 
support their level of use. There is evidence that some 
individuals may use heroin occasionally for years without 
becoming addicted. 42 In a 1971 survey of inmates in the 
District of Columbia jail, 4 7 per cent of the sample was 
found to be using heroin daily while an additional 21 per 
cent admitted using heroin on a non-daily basis within the 
past six months. 43 For almost every two dependent users, 
one "chipper" was reported. More surprisingly, the average 
length of heroin use reported for the chipper group was 
4.34 years, not significantly different than the average 
length of heroin use reported by those characterized as 
"addicted." 44 
The experience of the many servicemen in 
Vietnam who have experimented with potent and freely 
available heroin casts further doubt on the assumption that 
heroin use irreversably leads to addiction and the compul-
sive drug-seeking behavior perhaps associated with it. Of a 
group of 500 Army enlisted men, 90 per cent of whom had 
experimented, and two-thirds of whom had used heroin 
regularly for six months or longer while in Vietnam, only 
0. 7 per cent of a random sample were found to be heroin 
dependent one year after their return. 45 The federal 
government has interpreted these findings as suggesting that 
where heroin use has not become deeply ingrained into the 
user's social values, and where the drug is generally not 
ingested intravenously, there is a substantial chance that the 
user can return to a drug-free state with little difficulty. 46 
The observations of this study may or may not be 
applicable to domestic heroin users, who commonly take 
the drug by intravenous injection. Heroin users often say 
that drug-habits which center around the intense, euphroic 
effects of intravenous administration of heroin are 
substantially more difficult to break, an observation not yet 
tested scientifically. 
Besides blurring the distinction between user 
and "addict," estimates of heroin-related crime are based 
on the assumption that a heroin user's income is derived 
solely from burglary or crimes against persons. 47 The New 
York State Narcotic Addiction Control Commission has 
estimated that some 120,000 "addicts" in New York State 
alone steal $150 each per day for a total of $6.5 billion per 
year. 48 This kind of extrapolation is commonly made, yet 
in most cases, such estimates are based on unreliable 
statements or boasts by users about the extent of their use. 
Further, there is often a failure to distinguish between the 
minimum amount of heroin a dependent individual needs 
to ease withdrawal and the amount he would inject in a 
given day if he had his choice. The federal government has 
also conceded that inflated estimates putting drug-related 
property loss at multi-billion dollar levels may be inaccurate 
because they do not take into account the number of users 
in jail, in treatment, and those whose income is not gained 
from property crime. 49 This latter group, according to its 
estimate, may be as large as 25% of the heroin using 
population. so A more cautious 1970 Hudson Institute 
study criticized current very large estimates of heroin 
"addicts" and concluded that the number of users in New 
York City who regularly require narcotics cannot substanti-
ally exceed 70,000 si and cannot be responsible for more 
than $500 million in theft per year. 52 In addition, the 
Institute attributed more than 46% of all income used for 
drugs to sales of heroin and related services 53 and suggested 
that 30% of the income from sources outside the heroin 
business may come from prostitution alone. 54 
A not insubstantial amount of research 
providing insight into the causal relation between drug use 
and crime has been reported. 55 Most of it tends to support 
the common view that heroin users commit crime. Evidence 
of the specifics of the connection between drug taking and 
crime, however, is notably incomplete. The National 
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse exhaustively 
reviewed and evaluated the significant research. 56 Having 
examined the prominent studies in the field, the authors of 
this article generally agree with the conclusions of the 
National Commission and rely upon them. 
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categorized into four groups. The first is based upon 
interviews of selected criminal offenders. 57 The second 
compares drug using behaviors of groups of offenders with 
matched groups of non-offenders or different types of 
offenders. Another compares the criminal records of drug 
users with those of non drug users, and the fourth type 
compares the arrest records of individuals before and after 
the onset of drug use or dependence. 58 For all types of 
research, the Commission concluded that: 
Few studies either use prospective (following 
one or a number of cohorts through time) 
rather than restropective analysis or take into 
consideration multi-drug use patterns, or 
adequately investigate the individual's past 
psychological, social and behavioral history. As 
such, untested assumptions are accepted as 
given and invalid conclusions are presented as 
definitive. 59 
Where drug use prior to arrest is identified, the 
assertion of a causal link between drugs and crime has often 
been made. 60 In fact, much of the data indicate that the 
majority of heroin dependent persons are involved in crime 
before involvement with drugs. 61 This evidence represents 
a strong challenge to the hypothesis that drug use causes 
crime. As the National Commission concluded: 
Most of the researchers who have found that 
the majority of their sample populations were 
arrested before the onset of dependence agree 
that criminal behavior is not a by-product of 
dependence but results, as does the drug 
dependence itself, from psychological and 
social deviance which predates dependence and 
is ordinarily apparent by adolescence. The 
conclusion challenges the theory that drugs 
cause crime and stresses that drug dependence 
and criminality are two forms of social 
deviance, neither producing the other. 
It is generally agreed that drugs have the ability 
to exacerbate existing psychopathology, 
delinquency and criminality. However, such 
ability is conditional upon the pre-existence of 
psychological and social maladjustment prior to 
the onset of drug use or dependence. 62 
Heroin dependent persons tend to be young, 63 
of low educational achievement and generally have few 
legitimate occupational skills. 64 They are people who 
suffer the frustrations of poverty, limited economic 
opportunity, and racial discrimination. Large percentages of 
heroin dependent persons come from cultural settings in 
which "hustling" and criminal activity may be familiar and 
common phenomena. The subculture within which most 
heroin use grows is further characterized by a "variety of 
pathologies and illegal activities only one of which is the 
use of drugs," 65 much research showing that involvement 
in illegal activity precedes heroin use. 66 The criminal 
lifestyle is· a significant community institution flourishes 
where large numbers of individuals find most paths to 
legitimate successs blocked. The kind of work available to 
the typical heroin user is usually boring, unskilled labor 
that offers the lowest wages and no chance for advance-
ment. The alternative, and one perhaps more consistent 
with some community norms, is the life of the hustling 
heroin addict. 
One report on heroin users in New York City 
concluded that the activities and relationships connected 
with the quest for heroin are far more important to drug 
users than the passing euphoric effects of the diluted heroin 
available to them. 67 
Many addicts do not want to be cured, 68 and they see no 
comparable alternative which could provide the excitement 
and rewards of a drug-oriented life. Heroin use adds a sense 
of urgency, excitement, and challenge to the criminal 
lifestyle; it may make that lifestyle more rewarding. It is 
not the causative agent. Thus, the District of Columbia 
treatment agency has attributed a substantial reduction in 
reported heroin use in part to a shift in community 
attitudes toward the user and the pusher. 69 The pusher is 
no longer respected, and the "addict" is viewed as a "fool, 
. . . a parasite." 70 
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233 Heroin dependence and criminal behavior are 
symptoms of a fundamentally pathalogical social setting; 
they feed but do not cause each other. After reviewing 
several hundred documents and on the basis of its own 
research, the Marijuana Commission succinctly concluded: 
... It is difficult if not impossible, to establish 
a direct relationship between crime and the use 
of various drugs; but if one cannot say that the 
use of any drug in and of itself is directly 
responsible for the commission of a criminal 
act, it is possible to demonstrate that drug use 
in combination with a number of physiological, 
psychological and social factors may assume an 
important role in the exacerbation of criminal, 
delinquent or other anti-social behavior. 71 
Finally, a promising new approach to analyzing 
the significance of heroin-seeking activity within the larger 
context of property crime, which applies the economic 
notions of supply, demand, and markets as a means of 
understanding the relation between heroin use and criminal 
activity, should be noted. One recent study funded by the 
Drug Abuse Council constructed a retail heroin price series 
in a number of United States cities, based on information 
about costs and purity of heroin purchased by federal 
undercover agents and laboratory analysis data collected 
from July 1970 to June 1972. 72 The results of the analysis 
for nine major cities were mixed and ambiguous. 73 In New 
York City, however, reported revenue-producing crimes 
appeared to fluctuate significantly with the retail price of 
heroin. '14 The authors speculate that "while high prices of 
heroin [caused by intensive law enforcement activities] 
may lead to more crime in the short run, the same high 
prices may lead to a decrease in crime in the long run as a 
result of the decrease in the addict population". 75 Another 
analysis, soon to be published, looks at property crime 
from a risks, gains and maximization of profits perspective. 
It predicts that the elimination of heroin users from the 
criminal market place will have an indiscernable effect upon 
over-all crime statistics, because the equilibrium between 
supply and demand for criminal goods and services will 
merely be shifted. 76 The essay suggests that the criminal 
market for stolen property, like other markets, is limited in 
the traffic it can bear, so that entering heroin using thieves 
displace rather than supplement non-heroin using thieves in 
the total market. 77 
Pharmacological Questions 
One cannot understand drug taking and drug 
seeking behavior without some familiarity with the 
pharmacological properties of the drugs themselves. 
Unfortunately, many past and present drug laws are based 
on crude and often plainly wrong ideas about what certain 
drugs do. Particularly where the intent of legislation is to 
reduce drug related crime, a basic understanding of drugs 
and their effects is indispensable. The work of psychiatry 
professors Irwin 78 of the University of Oregon and 
Tinklenberg 79 of Stanford should be consulted by those 
who want a thorough review of the criminogenic properties 
of commonly abused drugs. 
When taken in excess, alcohol, the barbiturates 
(particularly short-acting barbiturates), the amphetamines 
and cocaine are the drugs most likely to produce socially 
dangerous behavior. 80 For the most part, however, the 
drugs whose effects may prompt criminal behavior either 
tend to pose only a short-term threat to the community, 
(e.g. amphetamines) or are commonly not included within 
the controls of drug-crime legislation (barbiturates, 
alcohol). 
While amphetamines can be ingested orally, the 
most serious form of their abuse involves "speed," the 
popular term for high dose injectable methamphetamine. 
These drugs stimulate the nervous system to the extent that 
the individual becomes vigorous, assertive and perhaps 
assaultive. 81 The excessive stimulation experienced by 
advanced speed users generally makes them incapacitated 
for legitimate employment as well as "hustling" and may 
force them to crime. 82 Injectable methamphetamine is 
characterized by a high degree of physical and psycholog-
ical toxicity. 83 The human body cannot tolerate sustained 
use and consequently the epidemic use of "speed," in any 
given population, generally runs its course within a short 
time. 84 / 
As for barbiturates and alcohol, their effects are 
so similar that one observer has suggested that barbiturates 
might easily be labelled "solid alcohol" and alcohol classed 
as "liquid barbiturate." 85 Because we know that alcohol 
use is positively connected with violent behavior many 
expect to find a similar connection with non-medical 
barbiturate use. 86 
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234 Cocaine is generally associated with heroin as a 
"hard drug." There are very little data on the relationship 
between cocaine use and crime. The only study available 
suggests that despite a pharmacological effect similar to 
amphetamines, assaultive behavior is infrequent. 87 There 
have been indications, however, that cocaine users are 
involved in crimes against property at a greater rate than 
users of other drugs. 88 
Psychedelic drugs and cannabis substances, 
according to most users and observers, tend to induce 
perceptual distortions and mood changes that effectively 
preclude aggressive behavior. 89 As with all psychoactive 
substances, the effect of these drugs upon behavior is 
markedly influenced by the user's personality, past drug 
experience, personal expectations of drug effect and mood 
and external surroundings. 90 Except during occasional 
panic-reactions, the use of psychedelic drugs may actually 
reduce assaultive, criminal behavior, 91 and there is 
considerable evidence that in the non-industrial countries 
where cannabis use has long been widespread, it is not a 
significant cause of serious crime or violence. 92 
It is heroin that most people associate with 
crime. There is general agreement that no present evidence 
exists that opiate use (including heroin) causes long-term 
physical or psychological degeneration. Long term users 
show no intellectual or moral deterioration traceable to the 
drug itself. 93 The behavior of persons under the influence 
of the drug tends to be tranquil and non-aggressive-
characterized by an "inability to concentrate, thinking 
difficulty, apathy, lessened physical acuity, and leth-
argy." 94 Opiates do not in themselves cause criminal 
behavior. 95 The first "expert" in narcotic addiction, Dr. 
Lawrence Kolb, wrote in 1925 that, while the ultimate 
effect of opiate dependency is to produce a state of idleness 
and dependency, enhancing the user's desire to live, as he 
put it, at the expense of others by anti-social means: 
The soothing effect of opiates in such cases is 
so striking and universally characteristic that 
one is led to believe violent crime would be 
much less prevale~t if all habitual criminals 
were addicts who could obtain sufficient 
morphine or heroin to keep themselves fully 
charged with one of these drugs at all times. 96 
If anything can be concluded about the 
pharmacological effects of heroin and anti-social behavior, 
it is that heroin is more likely than not to inhibit tendencies 
that users may have toward violent behavior. 97 
2 Legislating the Drugs-Crime Connection 
As discussed in the Introduction, proposals to 
curb crime by increasing penal ties for drug use have been 
directed at the sale of drugs, their possession and use, and 
at crimes committed after ingestion of drugs. In the 
interests of space, and to focus directly on the drugs-crime 
connection, this section examines only proposed statutes 
that use the drugs-crime assumption as a justification for 
imposing additional penalties on drug users who commit 
certain crimes. 98 Proposed statutes directed at crimes 
committed after the ingestion of drugs have included two 
elements: 
I A presumption that a drug detected in the 
body of a defendant after commission of a 
crime was in his body at the time the crime 
was committed. The implicit presumption is 
that taking the drug caused the person to 
commit the crime. This is the central 
ingredient of a drugs-crime statute. 
2 Attaching increased penalties for commit-
ting specified violent crimes after ingestion 
of specified drugs. 
To say the least, such proposals, if enacted, 
would face substantial constitutional challenges on several 
fronts, as explored below. 
Equal Protection Questions 
The most obvious objection to a special penalty 
scheme for drug users who commit violent crimes is the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Any 
statutorily-mandated punishment discrimination against 
drug users-particularly if the disparities are great-would 
be highly vulnerable to constitutional attack as an arbitrary, 
impermissible categorization in violation of the fourteenth 
amendment. 99 
Professors Tussman and tenBroek, in their 
influential and well-reasoned 1949 article, 100 argued that a 
legislative classification that is reasonable under the equal 
protection clause must include all people "similarly 
situated" 101 with respect to the purpose of the law. Meting 
out added punishment to drug-using violent criminals, who 
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235 comprise only part of the larger class violent criminals, is a 
clear example of what Tussman and tenBroek labelled 
"underinclusiveness" of statutory language: 
All who are included in the class are tainted 
with the mischief, but there are others also 
tainted whom the classification does not 
include. Since the classification does not 
include all those who are similarly situated with 
respect to the purpose of the law, there is a 
prima facie violation of the equal protection 
requirement of reasonable classification. 102 
In the years since the 1949 article, the 
constitutional rights of criminal defendants have been held 
to be a fundamental interest, deserving of special equal 
protection scrutiny. 103 Because the connection between 
drugs and criminal behavior is tenuous, the likelihood that 
significantly greater penalties for drug-using criminals could 
withstand equal protection challenges seems small. Further, 
equal protection arguments have recently been explicitly 
intertwined with arguments regarding cruel and unusual 
punishment under the eighth amendment. As Justice 
Douglas noted, concurring in last year's death sentence 
opinion, "[T) here is increasing recognition ... that the 
basic theme of equal protection is implicit in 'cruel and 
unusual' punishment." 104 
Due Process and 
the Test of Rationality 105 
Here we consider the implicit drugs-cause-crime 
presumption that follows from a statutory persumption 
that drugs found in the body after commission of a crime 
were in the body before commission of the crime, in the 
light of our earlier summary of presently available data on 
the relationship between crime and drugs particularly 
heroin. The authors assume arguendo that testing proce-
dures can determine whether a drug was ingested prior to 
commission of a crime, an assumption questioned in the 
next section. 
The Supreme Court has consistently invoked 
the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to strike down statutes which have unfairly 
shifted the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof in 
criminal cases 106 or have been based upon irrational 
presumptions. 107 
The general judicial approach to a statutory 
presumption, coming before a court backed by the 
"significant weight" 108 of a legislative finding, was 
well-stated by the Supreme Court thirty years ago: 
A statutory presumption cannot be sustained if 
there be no rational connection between the 
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if 
the infereence of one from proof of the other is 
arbitrary because of lack of connection 
between the two in common experience. This is 
not to say that a valid presumption may not be 
created upon a view of relation broader than 
that a jury might take in a specific case. But 
where the inference is so strained as not to have 
a reasonable relation to the circumstances of 
life as we know them, it is not competent for 
the legislature to create it as a rule governing 
the procedure of courts. 109 
Later Supreme Court decisions applied the 
above maxims to statutory ~resumptions in drug cases. 
United States v. Romano 11 and United States v. 
Gainey 111 involved the illicit production of a generally licit 
drug, alcohol. In Romano, a presumption of possession, 
custody, or control of an illegal still based upon mere 
presence at the still was held invalid because of its tenuous 
factual base. 112 In Gainey, on the other hand, the 
presumption that presence at an illegal still was "carrying 
on" the business of distilling alcohol illicitly was upheld as 
an expression of the most natural and likely proba-
bility. 113 Drug ingestion as the presumptive cause of 
criminal behavior suffers from Romano's tenuous factual 
base and falls far short of Gainey's natural and likely 
probability. 
In Leary v. United States 114 the Supreme 
Court invalidated a statutory presumption that mere 
possession of marijuana created a prima facie presumption 
of knowledge of illegal importation. After a detailed 
discussion of previous cases Justice Harlan concluded for 
the Court that: 
[A) criminal statutory presumption must be 
regarded as "irrational" or "arbitrary," and 
hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be 
said with substantial assurance that the 
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow 
from the proved fact on which it is made to 
depend. 115 
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236 Justice Harlan then thoroughly examined all 
available evidence on the importation of marijuana, 
concluding that, in light of the significant amount of 
domestic production, a "possession equals knowledge of 
illegal importation" presumption was too tenuous to be 
rational in constitutional terms. 116 The Court's immersion 
in empirical data about marijuana importation followed 
Gainey's admonition that "The process of making the 
determination of rationality is, by its nature, highly 
. empirical. ... " 117 It is the firm belief of the authors that a 
similarly complete examination of the pharmacological 
relation between the ingestion of many drugs, including 
heroin, and violent criminal behavior would yield the same 
constitutional conclusion reached by th~?urt in Leary. 
One year after Leary, in Turner v. United 
States, 118 the Court faced a similar challenge to the 
importation presumption as applied to heroin and cocaine 
found during the search of appellant's automobile. Similar 
presumptions had been upheld in earlier decisions on 
heroin, 119 morphine, 120 and opium, 121 but the Leary 
decision, which came after the Court of Appeals had 
affirmed appellant's conviction, cast new doubt on the 
continuing validity of the long-standing presumption. 122 In 
an opinion by Justice White, the Court studied all available 
information on cocaine and heroin production and 
importation, concluding that the knowledge-of-importation 
presumption was invalid constitutionally as to cocaine and 
valid as to heroin. "To possess heroin is to possess imported 
heroin," 123 the Court concluded. 
While the last-quoted remark of the Court in 
Turner does not necessarily mean that only a factually 
indisputable presumption will survive due process scrutiny, 
the cases discussed here indicate that proof of the fact upon 
which a presumption is based must be substantial·. In 
addition to the already-discussed deficiencies inherent in 
any drugs-crime presumption, there are other serious 
empirical questions. First, several drugs that would 
probably be included in any violent crimes statute can be 
possessed legally or illegally. Amphetamine and methadone 
are examples. The law would be working at cross purposes 
with its pronounced belief in methadone "treatment" if the 
presence of legal methadone in the body of a defendant 
could serve as the basis for a violent crime conviction and 
stiff penalty. On the other hand, to distinguish between 
lawful and unlawful methadone consumption would make 
assertions of a rational presumption based upon a 
methadone-crime connection very questionable and would 
raise serious equal protection problems. 
The common-sense observation that ingestion 
of a drug detected at some time after commission of a 
crime may easily have occurred between the crime and the 
testing rather than before the crime further.undercuts any 
drug-crime presumption. Presumably, the more recently a 
drug has been taken, the more easily it is detected. In 
addition, the generally held view is that most drug users 
who commit crimes do so not while under the influence of 
the drugs but rather to gain the money needed to place 
themselves under the influence of drugs. In other words, to 
the extent there is a rational basis for a drugs-crime 
presumption, it exists when a drug user perceives the need 
for money for a purchase, a time even more difficult to 
determine empirically than the moment of drug ingestion. 
Finally, a statutory presumption based upon 
the presence of a drug in the body would lose much of 
what logic and rationality it might have when more than 
one drug is present in a defendant's body. Poly- or 
multi-drug use is a widespread phenomenon. 124 One 
example of the problems poly-drug use could create should 
suffice. If a suspect were arrested shortly after the 
commission of a crime with heroin present in his body and 
with a significant amount of alcohol also present, (particu-
larly when we know that alcohol is positively connected 
with criminal behavior), could it be seriously argued that a 
presumption attributing causation to the illicit rather than 
the licit drug be rational and non-arbitrary? 
Search and Seizure 
Questions 
The State's delicately balanced interest in 
protecting the dignity and privacy of the individual while 
allowing reasonable incursions into private domains is 
reflected in the fourth amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable search and seizure. The ever-present problems 
of defining "unreasonable," and more occasional, of 
defining "search and seizure," 125 have occupied courts 126 
and commentators 127 for many years. Any statute that 
attempts to penalize drug users who commit violent crimes 
will necessarily require drug-detection tests of suspected 
drug users, thus raising a number of thorny search and 
seizure questions. 128 
The first set of problems is practical. Reversing 
the position adopted in the earlier due process discussion, 
the authors assume here arguendo that there is a solid 
connection between drug ingestion and criminal behavior. 
The question is then whether and how drugs can be 
detected in a person who will not volunteer information 
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237 about his drug use. In marked contracts to alcohol, clinical 
appearances of drug taking in a practiced user of opiates are 
often minimal. 129 The police will rarely be able to justify 
their decision to subject an arrestee to a drug examination 
on any basis such as odor on the breath or slurred speech. 
To combat this problem, the police can be expected to 
institute a procedure of routine drug examinations for all 
arrestees accused of crimes within the drugs-crime 
category, 130 a procedure of some constitutional question, 
as discussed below. 
The second practical problem is the accuracy of 
drug-detection tests. The opiates and the barbiturates can 
be detected in the urine, saliva, and blood through the use 
of thin-layer chromatography, gas-liquid chromatography, 
and spin immunoassay techniques. 131 Under certain 
· circumstances, large errors in urine drug analysis can 
occur. 132 Failure to monitor carefully testing procedures 
and failure to institute and maintain a regimen of quality 
can render inaccurate results. 133 The Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) recently announced the 
development of testing procedures for LSD, 134 but 
laboratories are not now equipped to detect hallucinogens 
in the urine or in the blood. 
Finally, there is the problem of tying the 
presence of a specific drug in an arrestee's body at the time 
of testing to its presence in his body prior to the commis-
sion of the charged crime. Heroin, excreted in the urine as 
morphine, can be detected up to 48 hours after ingestion, 
but up to 90 per cent of the excretion occurs within the 
first 24 hours. 135 The proposed New York statute, by way 
of example, would create the presumption whenever 
evidence of one of the specified drugs is detected within 48 
hours of the commission of a crime. 136 A defendant who 
took heroin shortly before committing a vi<)lent crime, did 
not take it again before his arrest, and was tested near the 
end of the proposed statute's 48-hour period might not be 
detected as a drug user. A defendant who used heroin after 
the crime might be more easily detected; in fact, the farther 
from the time of the crime and the closer to the statutory 
48-hour limit the heroin use occurs, the greater is the 
chance of registering positive on a urinalysis test. Such 
results would be possible with a drug-crime statute and 
present testing procedures. The absurdity of such a distinct 
possibility should give pause to anyone who would 
seriously try to legislate a drugs-crime presumption. 
A drugs-crime statute would also face practical 
problems regarding drugs that may remain in the body for 
long periods of time. For example, if barbiturates were 
included in a statute, traces of them could be detected in 
the urine as long as eight to twelve days after the adminis-
tration of a single dose. 137 Thus, under the 48 hour 
statutory provision, the presence of barbiturates in a 
defendant's body at the time of arrest would not be 
evidence that ingestion occurred before or even near the 
time of the crime. 
There are also difficult constitutional questions 
inherent in any intrusion into a person's body. The 
Supreme Court's frequent grappling with search-and-seizure 
questions has not substantially improved the test of 
constitutionality formulated by Justice Frankfurter in 
Rochin v. California, 138 when he concluded that pumping 
a defendant's stomach to recover morphine capsules was 
unconstitutional police conduct that "shocks the con-
science." 139 However, based upon cases such as Schmerber 
v. California; 140 which allowed a blood test for alcohol 
over the drunk driving suspect's protest, and later cases 
where searches not dissimilar to urinalysis have been 
approved, 141 there is a substantial likelihood that 
presently-existing drug tests such as urinalysis would be 
held reasonable under the fourth amendment. Of course 
tests that invade individual privacy much more than 
examining a urine sample and fall outside the Constitution 
as akin to Rochin's morphine-producing stomach pump, 
may eventually be developed. 
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3 Some Larger Questions about Drug Control Laws 
Should drug dependence 
be a defense to a 
criminal charge? 
Court opinions, particularly within the last few 
years, have cast doubt on the constitutional justifications 
for punishing personal drug use. In I 925, the Supreme 
Court declared that drug "addicts" were "diseased and 
proper subjects for [medical] treatment. ... " 142 Although 
intense enforcement efforts since I 925 indicate little 
agreement with that view of drug dependence as a medical 
problem, one basic issue regarding criminal treatment of the 
drug user has been settled: he cannot be punished solely for 
his status as a drug "addict." To do so would be cruel and 
unusual punishment under Robinson v. California. 143 
Possession of drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia are 
still crimes, but whether they should be has been a subject 
of public and judicial debate since Robinson. Reputable 
groups that can hardly be considered pro-drug use have 
criticized possession laws as unworkable and as repugnant 
intrusions into private conduct. 144 
Post-Robinson developments in the case law 
indicate that American society, through the courts, will 
soon decide whether the victimless act of drug use should 
be punished criminally without the presence of some 
attendant social harm such as robbery. In the closely-
related area of alcoholism, lower federal courts after 
Robinson faced arguments that criminally punishing 
alcoholics was cruel and unusual punishment and that 
chronic alcoholics were unable to form the intent required 
to commit serious crimes. 145 In 1968, the Supreme Court 
in Powell v. Texas 146 refused to follow Robinson's broader 
implications when it affirmed a chronic alcoholic's 
conviction for public drunkenness. Powell articulates no 
clear constitutional principle; Justice White concurred in 
the judgment while indicating sympathy with the reasoning 
of the four dissenting Justices. 147 Justice Marshall, 
speaking for the four plurality Justices, argued that Powell 
was distinguishable from Robinson because, in contrast to 
the "status" crime of Robinson, it involved public behavior 
which could create health and safety problems and which 
offended "moral and esthetic sensibilities." 148 Further, 
according to Justice Marshall, to extend Robinson to public 
drunkenness would involve the Court in the unwanted role 
of defining a constitutional insanity test. 149 For the 
dissent, Justice Fortas expressed a theme present in 
Robinson and pursued in two later cases in the District of 
Columbia: 150 
Robinson stands upon a principle which, 
despite its subtlety, must be simply stated and 
respectfully applied because it is the foundation 
of individual liberty and the cornerstone of the 
relations between a civilized state and its 
citizens: Criminal penalties may not be inflicted 
upon a person for being in a position he is 
powerless to change. 
Attempts to extend Robinson to drug 
possession charges in the District of Columbia have until 
recently followed the unsuccessful strategy of the 
defendant in Horton v. United States 152 of trying to 
squeeze drug "addiction" into the insanity defense as 
developed in McDonald 153 and Durham 154 . Two cases 
now on appeal have taken a related, but distinctly different 
approach. Now awaiting an en bane decision in the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals (the highest local court in 
the District) is Franklin v. United States. 155 In the 
now-vacated three-judge decision (with one dissent), that 
court held that "drug dependence" is an independent 
affirmative defense that can negate criminal responsibility 
on a charge of possessing narcotics for one's personal use. 
Similar to the insanity defense, it nevertheless is separate 
from it as another category of criminal non-responsibility. 
The same issue is now pending before the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in United 
States v. Moore. 156 Franklin and Moore follow a spate of 
scholarly discussions of drug dependence and crimi-
nality, 157 discussions undeterred by Powell's rejection of 
the alcohol addiction defense. 
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239 Moore is the more interesting case, both 
because a decision from that United States Court of 
Appeals will have a significant impact throughout the 
country and because of the personal characteristics of the 
defendant. Moore, 43 years old, began using heroin when 
the "law of averages" 158 finally caught up with him. 
Appellant's central argument is as follows: 
Innumerable decisions in both this and other 
jurisdictions hold that conduct which is the 
product of a disability that substantially 
deprives a person of the capacity to avoid his 
offending behavior cannot be punished as 
criminal. Neither the name of the particular 
disability involved ... nor its cau!l(: is control-
ling. The central issue is whether it substantially 
impairs its victims behavior controls and thus 
deprives him of the ability to conform his 
conduct to the requirements .of law. 159 
Appellant in Moore is not arguing that one is either a drug 
"addict" with totally impaired behavior controls or is not 
an ''addict" or drug dependent person at all, a simplistic 
view exemplified by numerous comments in Robinson. 160 
Rather, the degree of impairment should be a question for 
the jury to decide, with the assistance of expert testimony. 
Two important questions are raised but not 
directly answered by the appellant's approach in Moore and 
the similar approach in Franklin. First, if a defendant . 
convinces the jury that his drug dependence "substantially 
impaired" his behavior controls, what is to be done with 
him? Second, should a drug dependence test be allowed 
only when a person is charged with a drug violation and not 
when he is charged with a crime such as robbery? If 
experience and litigation in the mental health arena are 
guides, the alternative of compulsory commitment to a 
drug "treatment" facility would be questionable legally and 
practically. 161 While Franklin and Moore concern only 
possession, and while appellant in Moore argues that a drug 
dependence defense need not be extended to non-drug 
crimes, 162 future litigants may well argue that the logic of 
the defense, if accepted in one context, together with 
elementary equal protection concepts, requires that drug 
dependence be permitted as an affirmative defense to any 
crime. What may emerge as a middle position, if drug 
dependence is raised as a defense to non-drug crimes that 
require the formation of a specific intent is something akin 
to the doctrine of "diminished capacity, "an affirmative 
defense often used in California. 163 For example, under 
the "diminished capacity" defense a homicide defendant 
high on barbiturates might not be capable of forming the 
specific intent to commit murder but still capable of 
forming a general intent to harm his victim sufficient to 
justify a conviction for manslaughter. 164 The diminished 
capacity defense is only at best a partial answer to the 
problem of how to treat people with significant degrees of 
drug dependence. For the seriously dependent person, the 
troubling prospect of involuntary commitment for 
"treatment" may loom as the supposedly humane 
alternative to criminal punishment. 
Should the criminal law 
withdraw from th~ 
drug possession arena altogether? 
Every person who uses illicit drugs is "a walking 
illegal enterprise." 165 Whether that should be the case is at 
the heart of Moore and Franklin. There is increasing 
espousal of the idea that possession and related offenses 
should not be crimes at all, whether committed by casual 
users or compulsive dependents. 166 To eliminate use 
offenses completely would no doubt be considered by 
many too drastic a departure from present public policy. 
To say that the "sick addict" can use his condition as a 
defense to a possession charge may compo~t with tradition-
al common law notions of criminal responsibility; to 
eliminate the crimes themselves would be a far more radical 
step. 167 
Drug use, however, fits into some traditional 
legal molds that make the elimination of drug offenses 
appear to be a less radical proposition. Foremost is the 
elusive constitutional "right to privacy." Fiist used over 80 
years ago as a phrase in support of granting tort relief to 
those whose personal affairs were publicly exploited, 168 
the concept has expanded to cover a wide variety of 
activity. 169 The right to privacy has no firm grounding in a 
particular provision of the Constitution that is valid for 
every case, 170 but, like "due process,'! its amorphousness 
·may prove to be its greatest strength. 
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240 In its most recent discussion of privacy, the 
Supreme Court explicitly refused to adopt the notion of 
privacy under discussion here, declaring that: 
[I) t is not clear to us that the. claim asserted by 
some amici that one has an unlimited right to 
do with one's body as one pleases bears a close 
relationship to the right of privacy previously 
articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court 
has refused to recognize an unlimited right of 
this kind in the past. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
197 U.S. 11 (1905)(vaccination; Buck v. Bell 
274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization). 171 
Yet, taken together, the more recent judicial discussions 
and expansions of the privacy concept, increasingly 
frequent suggestions that possession of some drugs-e.g., 
marijuana-be "decriminalized" by eliminating possession 
penalties, and strong drug dependence test case such as 
Moore, contribute to a movement for reform that, in a less 
hostile political era, 172 may result in the elimination of 
drug crimes from the statute books. 
A concluding look at the obscenity thicket into 
which the Supreme Court has wandered may also be useful. 
In Stanley v. Georgia, 173 the Court held that the first and 
fourteenth amendments protect the reading and possession 
in the home of otherwise constitutionally unprotected 
obscenity. The Court explicitly noted that statutes 
outlawing possession of other undesirable goods "such as 
narcotics" 174 were still permissible, but it also made a 
comment which undercuts its drug possession stance. In the 
Court's view, because there is at present no convincing 
evidence that exposure to obscenity leads to the commis-
sion of sex crimes, abnormal sexual behavior, or other 
antisocial conduct," ... the State may no more prohibit 
mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it 
may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit 
possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may 
lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits." 175 Based 
on what is now known about the pharmacology of heroin, 
one can persuasively argue that prohibiting its possession on 
the ground that ingestion of it may lead to crime or other 
antisocial conduct simply has no basis in fact and is 
constitutionally invalid. Those drugs that may prompt 
criminal behavior, notably alcohol and barbiturates, are 
generally not subject to penalties for personal possession. If 
they were, there would still be a substantial question 
whether the drugs-crime connection was strong enough to 
justify outright prohibition under the logic of the 
above-quoted remarks in Stanley. 
When drug users, particularly heroin users, do 
commit crimes to obtain money for drugs, such action . 
arguably occurs only because the prohibition of drugs-with 
its attendant high prices and black market system-rather 
than the chemical action of drugs themselves-force them 
to obtain large amounts of money to buy the commodity 
of their choice. The law creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Drug users do commit crimes, but the cause-and-effect 
relation is not at all the one envisioned in Stanley. It is a 
relation attributable to the structure and implementation of 
the laws, not to the action of the drug. To punish drug 
users for possession on the frequently false and misleading 
theory of a general pharmacological drugs-crime connection 
makes little empirical sense and further confuses an already 
jumbled area of the criminal law. In a perfectly circular 
fashion, the law has created a substantial drugs-crime 
connection by declaring certain drugs illegal and making 
them expensive and hard to get. 
Man has always used psychoactive drugs and 
will no doubt continue to do so for a variety of reasons. 
From era to era " ... only the drugs differ, not the essential 
purpose." 176 This paper was not designed to pass judgment 
on the value of mind-altering drugs, but rather to ask 
whether America's official response to the continuing 
phenomenon of drug use makes sense. The authors think it 
does not. Whatever the latest treatment ideas, and whatever 
the efforts of law enforcement personnel, 177 drug use and 
abuse remain. Their forms may change from time to time, 
no doubt in part because of efforts by the drug abuse 
industry, but mind-altering drugs seem to be here to stay. If 
so, much of the time and money directed at this intractable 
problem may do nothing but accord it an importance it 
·does not deserve. 
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1 Technically "a drug is any substance 
other than food which by its chemical 
natu.te affects the structure or function 
of the living organism." National 
Commission on Marihuana·and Drug 
Abuse, Drug Use in America: Problem in 
Perspective 9(2d Report 1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Drug Use in 
Ameriw). 
As Drug Use in America, supra at 9-10, 
points out, many Americans place a 
negative value on the word "drug," 
equating it with the "drug problem." 
One survey conducted in preparation for 
Drug Use in America found that 90 per 
cent of the adults and 96 per cent of the 
youth sampled believed that heroin is a 
drug, while only 39 and 34 percent, 
respectively, believed that alcohol is a 
drug. 
In this article the authors use the work · 
"drug," unless otherwise specified, to 
cover the illicit, psychoactive drugs that 
are the subjects of most legislation, e.g., 
heroin, cocaine, LSD. As our discussion 
emphasizes, these drugs are not the only 
drugs with which we should be 
concerned; in fact, overattention to 
them may have kept from scrutiny other 
powerful drugs, e.g., barbiturates, 
produced legally and used widely for 
recreational non-medical purposes.· 
2 The anti-pleasure element in drug 
control policies continues to be 
expressed by many people, including 
experts and officials in the drug field. 
Dr. Herbert Kleber, director of the Drug 
Dependence Unit of the Connecticut 
Mental Health Center, recently proposed 
that drug users be imprisoned if 
necessary to keep them from using 
drugs. "Few individuals in any sphere of 
life give up pleasures on their own unless 
there is pain or fear of pain greater than 
the pleasures involved," Kleber 
contended in support of his position. 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1973, at 39 (city 
ed.). 
3 For the sake of convenience and 
space-saving, "crime" in this article 
refers to those traditional indicia of 
criminal behavior-e.g., murder, rape, 
robbery, assault-that are reported by 
agencies such as the FBI. These crimes 
are also most closely associated with 
drug use in the public's mind. They are, 
however, highly selective-and some 
might argue economically and socially 
.discriminatory-indicators that omit 
most middle-class, or white-collar crime, 
4 See note 98, infra. 
S S. 1356; N.Y. Leg. 1973. 
6 S .. 918, 93 Cong., 1st Sess.; see note 98 
infra and discussion following. 
7 The most thorough historical analysis is 
D. Musto, The American Disease:· 
Origins of Narcotic Control (1973). 
David Musto, M.D., is an assistant 
professor of history and psychiatry at 
Yale University and a Fellow of the 
Drug Abuse Counc;.il. 
8 R. King, The Drug Hang-Up: America's 
Fifty-Year Folly (1972); King, The 
Narcotics Bureau and the Ha"ison Act: 
Jailing the Healers and the Sick, 62 Yale 
L.J. 751 (1953). Washington, D.C., 
lawyer Rufus King has long been 
involved in drugs and the law, serving as 
legislative counsel for Senator Kefau-
ver's Crime Committee in 1951 and 
Chairman of the ABA-AMA Committee 
on Narcotic Drugs in 1956. 
9 What the drtig control laws have done is 
to involve the police in numerous highly 
questionable enforcement practices. The 
latest example of the tension between 
eo_nstitutional propriety and police 
attempts to stamp out drug use is 
United States v. Russell, 41 U.S.L.W. 
4538 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1973) (5-4 
decision). The Court in Russell upheld 
appellant's conviction for illicitly 
manufacturing and selling methampheta-
mine (speed), overruling the entrapment 
defense that the undercover agent 
supplied appellant with an essential 
ingredient that was difficult to obtain 
without a manufacturer's license. So 
long as the government tries to regulate 
the personal use of drugs, cases like 
Russell will continue to confront the 
courts and to place police officers in "a 
debased role." 41 U.S.L.W. at 4543 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). See discussion 
in Section Ill infra. 
10 E. Brecher et al., Licit and Illicit Drugs 
(1972) (highly-touted, much-discussed 
Consumers Union publication); Drug 
Abuse Survey Project, Dealing With 
Drug Abuse (1972) (a report to the 
Ford Foundation by a team of experts 
that led to the formation of the Drug 
Abuse Council); National Commission 
on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, Drug 
·use in America, supra note 1. 
These more recent books had a solid 
base of earlier knowledge on which to 
build. For example, some five years 
_,after the event the federal government's 
Public Health Service published an 
excellent set of papers delivered at a 
1958 symposium on the history of 
American drug control efforts. Narcotic 
Drug Addiction Problems (R. Livingston 
ed. 1963). 
11 The Strategy Council, Federal Strategy 
for Drug Abuse and Drug Traffic 
Prevention 1973 [hereinafter cited as 
Federal Strategy). 
12 See, e.g., the brief discussion of 
problems inherent in trying to gauge the 
drugs-crime relation. Federal Strategy 
14-15. 
13 Like "crime" note 3 supra, "treatment" 
is also a loaded word. Much of what is 
labelled drug "treatment" is in fact 
indefinite narcotics maintenance in the 
form of methadone rather than heroin. 
Few.methadone programs have 
meaningful treatment components, in 
the form of psychiatric counseling, 
vocational training, or the like. To 
maintain is not to treat, using the latter 
word in a traditional medical sense. 
Narcotics maintenance on methadone 
may have its value-a subject of much 
debate-but it should be labelled for 
what it is and not falsely advertised as 
''treatment." 
14 Federal Strategy 36 (although expanded 
civil commitment not presently 
advisable, Government should begin 
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depending upon the nature of the drug, 
the route of administration, the dose 
and frequency of administration, other 
pharmacological variables, the persona-
lity of the user and the nature of the 
environment. 
· In this connection, it is important to 
discard the undimensional concept of 
individual loss of self-control which has 
long dominated scientific and lay 
concepts of "addiction." 
Drug Use in America 139. 
2S D. Musto, The American Disease, supra 
note 7, at 246. Similarly, "[n)arcotics 
have been blamed for a variety of 
America's ill5, form crime waves to 
social disharmony. Their bad effects 
have been given as the excuse for 
repressing certain minorities, as evidence 
for stopping legal heroin maintenance in 
1919, and as evidence for starting legal 
heroin maintenance in 1972." Id. 
26 Sixth Presidential Message to Congress 
on the State of the Union 7, 93d Cong.; 
1st Sess. (March 14, 1973). 
27 21 u.s.c. 1175. 
28 Governor Rockefeller substantially 
modified the penalty side of his 
proposals, see note 98 infra, but the 
tone remains the same as that expressed 
here. 
29 Testimony of Governor Nelson A. 
Rockefeller at Joint Hearing Before New 
York Senate and Assembly Codes 
Committees 1 (Jan. 30, 1973). 
30 N. Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 81.01 (b) 
(McKinney Supp. 1972). 
31 S. 800, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 405 A 
(1973). Section 405 A passed the Senate 
by an 81-12 vote. 119 Cong. Rec. S. 
6554 (daily ed. April 3, 1973); S. 800 
passed the Senate by a 93-1 vote. 119 
Cong. Rec. S. 6557 (daily ed. April 3, 
1973). The bill is now before the House 
Judiciary Committee. 
32 119 Cong. Rec. S. 6542 (daily ed. April 
3, 1973) (remarks of Senator Tal-
madge). 
33 Drug Use in America 154, 155. 
34 Id. 
3S Mandel, Problems with Official Drug 
Statistics, 21 Stanford L. Rev. 991 
(1969). Mandel is currently a Drug 
Abuse Council Fellow in Washington, 
D.C. 
36 Id. at 1039. 
37 Id. at 991: 
38 Federal Strategy 12. This is not 
represented to be the number of 
heroin-dependent persons but includes 
"addicts" and users. In its national 
survey, the Marijuana Commissi·on 
found that heroin had the lowest 
reported rate of incidence of all drugs 
included in the survey and sta.ted that 
1.3 per cent of its sample of adults (or a 
projected 1,817,06 and 0.6 per cent 
(149,430) of youth (12-17 years old) 
had claimed to have tried heroin at least 
once. These figures are further qualified 
by the Commission in light of the fact 
that the majority of street users of 
heroin would apparently go uncounted 
in a household survey. Drug Use in 
America 69. The federal government 
also believes that, following a doubling 
of the heroin "addict" population from 
1965 through 1969, the growth of 
heroin "addiction" has slowed in the 
past two years. Special Analyses: Budget 
of the United States Government, supra 
note 18, at 288. For a discussion of the 
methods used to estimate the numbers 
of heroin "addicts," see Holahan & 
Henningsen, ''The Economics of 
Heroin," in Dealing With Drug Abuse, 
supra note 10, at 285-88. 
39 Telephone call to the Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 
Washington, D.C., April 16, 1973. The 
monstrous problems associated with 
estimating the numbers of dependent 
persons, users, and occasional users have 
not deterred the Bureau from pinpoint· 
ing the exact number of a group called 
"abusers of narcotics." There can be no 
assurances that public policies founded 
on these estimates have any basis in fact 
whatsoever. 
The Bureau also makes available 
numbers of "active narcotic addicts" 
reported to it by state and local 
authorities. Because the reports are 
submitted on a voluntary basis, the 
Bureau is unable to vouch for the 
validity of the statistics. Further, the 
numbers do not include addicts 
unknown to state and local agencies. 
The total number reported for the 
nation is 95,392. BNDD, Reported 
Narcotic Abusers, Calendar Year 1972 
(1973). 
40 See N. Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1973, at 1 
(reporting new study by Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration 
estimating that in some categories 
umeported crimes could exceed 
reported crimes by five times). 
41 Jaffe, Drug Addiction and Drug Abuse, 
in The Pharmacological Basis of 
Therapeutics 281 (4th ed., L. Goodman 
& A. Gilman (1970). 
The new Methadone Regulations issued 
by the Food and Drug Administration 
have established mandatory physiologi-
cal addiction standards which potential 
patients must meet to be eligible for 
admission to maintenance treatment. To 
prevent admission of persons not first 
dependent on heroin at least two years 
prior to admission, evidence of physical 
dependence is to be obtained by · 
observing withdrawal symptoms, along 
with a positive urine test and the 
presence of needle marks. 21 C.F.R. 
l 30.44(d)(3)(ii). 
42 Powell, A Pilot Study of Occasional 
Heroin Users. 28 Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 
586 (April 1973). This Drug Abuse 
Council-sponsored study indicated that 
12 largely middle-class young adults 
from intact families, with no history of 
addiction, seemed able to maintain 
intermittent use of he~oin without 
becoming dependent. 
43 Bass, Brown & Dupont, The Use of 
Heroin By an Offender Population-A 
Report Over Time, 18 Corrective 
Psychiatry & J. Social Therapy 24 
(1972). 
44 Id. 
4S Federal Strategy 12. 
46 Id. The Defense Department has 
recently released a detailed study of 
drug use among Americans in Vietnam 
which suggests that many Army enlisted 
men successfully stopped using heroin 
upon returning home. See N. Y. Times, 
April 24, 1973, at 1. 
47 Most heroin dependent persons must 
resort to crimes other than the crimes 
associated with the narcotics laws 
themselves. For the most part they 
engage in crimes against property-
burglary and shoplifting. Drug Use in 
America 175. There is evidence that 
"addicts" tend to commit crimes of 
violence-street robberies-as frequently 
as "non-addicts." Kozel et al., Narcotics 
and Crime: A Study of Narcotic 
Involvement in an Offender' Population, 
7 Int'! J. Addictions 443, 450 (1972). 
While "addicts" undoubtedly consider 
the increased risks involved with violent 
personal crime, it is plausible that they 
tend to avoid crimes not involving 
financial gain. Preble & Casey, Taking 
Care of Business-The Heroin User's Life 
on the Street, 4 Int'l J. Addictions 1, 18 
(1969). 
The popular press is now beginning to 
question the assumptions and figures 
supporting the connection between 
drugs and crime. See Markham, Heroin 
Hunger May Not a Mugger Make, N. Y. 
Times, Mar. 18, 1973, 6 (Magazine), at 
38. 
48 Quoted by Gov. Rockefeller in his 
testimony of Jan. 30, 1973, on S. 1356, 
N.Y. Leg.1973,discussed infra. 
49 Federal Strategy 15. Again, the 
distinction between heroin use and 
heroin dependence is not made. 
SO Id. 
S 1 Singer & Newitt, Policy Concerning 
Drug Abuse in New York State- Vol. 1: 
The Basic Study 10 (Hudson Institute 
1970). . 
S2 Id. at 9. 
S3 Id. at 60. 
S4 Id. at 57. 
SS E.g., Brown & Silverman, The Reta ii 
Price of Heroin: Estimation ant.! 
Applications, March 16, 1973 (unpub-
lished study by Public Research 
Institute of the Center for Naval 
Analyses, on file at Drug Abuse 
Council); Eckerman et al., Drug Usage 
and Arrest Charges: A Study of Drug 
Usage and Arrest Charges Among 
Arrestees in Six Metropolitan Areas of 
the United States (December, 1971 
report by Justice Department's Bureau 
of Narcotics & Dangerous Drugs); 
Gearing, Methadone Maintenance 
Treatment Five Years Later: Where Are 
They Now?, Nov. 21, 1972 (unpub-
lished, on file at Drug Abuse Council); 
Hayim, Changes in the Criminal 
Behavior of Heroin Adicts: A One-Year 
Follow-Up of Methadone Treatment, 
Dec. 1972 (unpublished evaluation of 
Addiction Research & Treatment Corp., 
Brooklyn, N. Y., done for Justice 
Department's Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration); Kolb, Drug 
Addiction in its Relation to Crime, 9 
Mental Hygiene 74 (1925) (excellent 
early work by a pioneer in drug 
15
Moore: Drugs and Crime: A Bad Connection?
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1973
243 
research); Kozel et aL, supra note 47; 
Miller et al., Kinds of Addict-Crime: The 
Criminal Career Pattern of Addicts 
Seeking Treatment at ARTC, July 27, 
1972 (unpublished report on Addiction 
Research & Treatment Corp., done for 
Justice Department's Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration); Preble & 
Casey, supra note 47; Singer & Newitt, 
supra note 51; Tinklenberg, Drugs and 
Crime; October, 1972 (consultant's 
report prepared for Drug Use in 
America, supra note 1; to be released 
summer 1973 in appendix to Drug Use 
in America) [hereinafter cited as 
Tinklenberg]; Trobe, An Analysis of 
Addict Admissions to Four N. Y.C. 
Co"ectional Institutions, March 12, 
1973 (unpublished report of New York 
City's Health·Services Administration on 
file at Drug Abuse Council and at Health 
Services Administration). 
56 Drug Use in America 170-81. 
57 Id. at 170-71. 
58 Id. at 171. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 171-72. 
62 Id. at 172. 
63 This may be changing. In the District of 
Columbia, the mean age of identified 
heroin users rose 2 l /2 years over a 1 
1/2 year period while the mean age of 
the non-drug using population remained 
constant. Dupont & Green, The Decline 
of Heroin Addiction in the District of 
Columbia 4 (unpublished paper 
submitted to the 1973 Methadone 
Conference held in March in Washing-
ton, D.C., on file at Drug Abuse 
Council). 
64 Preble & Casey, supra note 47, at 17. 
The same characteristics were observed 
among heroin users in the Army in Viet 
Nam. A Defense Department study 
found that the men most likely to have 
been involved with drugs were young, 
single, black, low ranking members of 
the regular I Army with little education, 
who came from broken homes, having 
arrest histories before enlisting, and had 
used drugs before military service. N. Y. 
Times, April 24, 1973, at 1. 
65 Drug Use in America 166. 
66 Brown et al., Jn Their Own Words: 
Addicts' Reasons for Initiating 
Withdrawing From Heroin, 6 Int'! J. 
Addictions 635 (197 l); Drug Use in 
America 171. 
67 Preble & Casey supra note 47, at 21. 
68 Singer & Newitt, supra note 57, at 5; 
Federal Strategy 16. 
69 DuPont & Green, supra note 63, at 1. 
70 Id. at 7. 
71 Drug UseinAmerica 156. 
72 Brown & Silverman, supra note 55. 
73 Id. at 43. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 42. 
76 Gould, ''Crime and the Addict-Beyond 
Common Sense,'' 22 (chapter in 
forthcoming book Drugs and the 
Criminal Justice System (lnciardia & 
Chambers eds. 1973). 
77 Id. at 12. 
78 Irwin, A Rational Approach to Drug 
Abuse Prevention, 2 Contemp. Drug 
Prob. 3 (Spring, 1973). 
79 Tinklenberg, supra note 55. 
80 Irwin, supra note 78, at 22. 
81 Tinklenberg 48. 
82 Brecher, supra note 10, at 252. 
83 Smith & Fisher, A cute Amphetamine 
Toxicity, 2 J. Psychedelic Drugs 49 
(Fall, 1969). 
84 For a thorough introduction to 
amphetamines and methamphetamine, 
see the collection of articles in 2 J. 
Psychedelic Drugs (Fall, 1969). 
85 Brecher, supra note 10, at 252. 
86 Tinklenberg 44. 
87 Id. at 67. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 27, 68. 
90 Canadian Commission of Inquiry into 
the Non-Medical Use of Drugs, Cannabis 
108 (Interim Report, 1972), (Le Dain 
Commission). 
91 Tinklenberg 72. 
92 Cannabis, supra note 90. 
93 Brecher,supra note 10, at 27. 
94 Tinklenberg 15. 
95 Koran, Heroin Maintenance for Heroin 
Addicts: Issues and Evidence, 288 
N.Eng.J.Med. 658 (1973). 
96 Kolb, supra note 55, at 75. 
97 Kramer, Introduction to A mph eta mine 
Abuse, 2 J. Psychedelic Drugs 8 (Fall, 
1969). 
98 E.g .. S. 918, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 
4058 (introduced by Senator Gurney et 
al.); S. 1356, N.Y. Leg. 1973, § § 9-11 
(introduced by N.Y. State Senator 
Barclay et al.). On April 13, 1973, 
Governor Rockefeller modified his drug 
control proposal, eliminating the 
ingestion-causes-crime presumption. On 
May 8, a modified version of the bill, 
with slightly relaxed penalties, was 
signed into law by Governor Rocke-
feller. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1973, at 1.) A 
similar provision is still in S. 918, the 
federal bill. It reads in relevant part as 
follows: 
Cornrnis!ion of Felony While Under The 
Influence of Certain Narcotic Drugs 
SEC. 405B. (a) It shall be unlawful for 
any person at least sixteen years of age, 
after having knowingly caused any 
unlawfully possessed controlled 
substance classified in schedule I or II 
which is a narcotic drug to be intro-
duced into his body and while such 
substance is present in his body, to 
commit any offense in violation of 
section 81, 1111, 1112, 1114, 1201, 
2031, 2032, or subsection (a), (b), (c), 
or (d) of section 1751, or chapter 103 
of title 18, United States Code, or 
section 902(i) of the Federal Aviation 
Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1472). 
(b) Any person at least sixteen years of 
age who violates subsection (a) of this 
section shall be sentenced to life 
imprisonment. If such person, at the 
time of such violation, was at least 
nineteen years of age, the imposition or 
execution of such sentence shall not be 
suspended, probation shall not be 
granted, and section 4202 and chapter 
309 of title 18, United States Code, and 
the Act of July 15, 1932 (D.C.Code, 
secs. 24-203-24-207), shall not apply. 
If, in the case of any person so 
sentenced for such violation, such 
person was, at the time of that violation, 
not less than sixteen years of age or 
more than eighteen years of age, the 
foregoing provision of this subsection 
shall apply to the sentence so imposed 
for such violation, except that such 
person may be eligible for parole after 
having served not less than fifteen years 
of such sentence. 
(c) The presence of any amount of a 
controlled substance classified in 
schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug 
in the body of any person within 
forty-eight hours after such person has 
allegedly committed any offense 
referred to in subsection (a) of this 
section shall be presumptive evidence 
that such person knowingly caused such 
substance while unlawfully possessed to 
be introduced into his body and that 
such substance was present in his body 
at the time of the commission of such 
offense. 
(d) (1) Where there is any cause to 
believe that a person arrested for, and 
within forty-eight hours of, the alleged 
commission of any such offense referred 
tci in subsection (a) of this section had 
present in his body at the time of the 
commission of that offense any such 
substance referred to in subsection (a) 
of this section, the arresting officer or 
appropriate attorney for the government 
or appropriate judicial officer, promptly 
after such arrest, shall require and cause 
such person to undergo a medical 
examination at such facility, and in 
accordance with such procedures, as 
shall be designated and established in 
accordance with subsection (c) of this 
section to determine whether any such 
substance is present in such person's 
body. 
(2) Where the arrest for any such 
offense occurs more than forty-eight 
hours following the alleged commission 
of such offense, the appropriate 
attorney for the government or an 
appropriate judicial officer, if there is 
any cause to believe that such person so 
arrested had present in his body at the 
time of the commission of such offense 
any such substance referred to in 
subsection (a) of this section, may 
require and cause the person so arrested 
to undergo such a medical examination. 
(3) No person who is required or 
ordered to undergo a medical examina· 
tion pursuant to this section shall be 
released from custody on his own 
recognizance or bail within forty-eight 
hours of the time of his arrest unless and 
until he has undergone such medical . 
examination .... 
(e) (1) (M] edical examinations required 
by this section may include, but shall 
not be limited to, blood tests and thin 
layer chromatography, as well as any 
necessary treatment. 
The federal bill would cover only the 
ingestion of Schedule land ll (21 U.S.C. 
§ 812(c)) "narcotic drugs," defined in 
21 U.S.C. § 802 (lB) to include the 
opiates such as heroin, opium, and 
methadone. The New York bill would 
16
Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 3 [1973], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol3/iss3/1
244 
have included· the opiates plus cocaine, 
LSD, amphetamine, and hashish. 
The crimes covered by the federal bill 
include kidnapping (18 U.S.C. § 1201), 
bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113), and 
aircraft piracy (49 U.S.C. § 1472). 
Both the New York and the federal bill 
would impose mandatory life imprison-
ment-with no suspended sentence, 
probation, or parole possibilities-upon 
a conviction for violating the ingestion 
provision. (Youths 16-19 in New York, 
and 16-18 at the federal level, would be 
eligible for parole after 15 years of 
imprisonment.) 
Not analyzed here are important 
questions raised by the quoted portion 
of S. 918 that are not strictly drug-
related. For example, must "any cause" 
in section 405 B (d) (1) be read to mean 
probable cause? Is the limitation on bail 
in subsection (d) (3) constitutional? 
99 See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U,S. 457 
(1957); Griffin v. Illinois. 351 U.S. 12 
(1956) (indigent criminal defendant 
must get free trial transcript for his first 
appeal of right). See also Tussman & 
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the 
Laws, 37 Cal L. Rev. 341 (1949); 
Developments in the Law-Equal 
Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 
1177-80 (1969). 
100 Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 99. 
101 Id. at 346. 
102 Id. at 348. 
103 Developments in the Law-Equal 
Protection, supra note 99, at 1127 & n. 
285. 
104 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249 
(1972) (5-4 decision). The Court's per 
curiam opinion in Furman was largely 
though not explicitly based upon a 
blending of the cruel and unusual 
punishment and equal protection 
arguments articulated by Justice 
Douglas. See Goldberg & Dershowitz, 
Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitu-
tional, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1773, 1790 
(1970) ("A penalty ... should be 
considered 'unusually' imposed if it is 
administered arbitrarily or discrimina-
torily. "). 
105 See generally Sandler, The Statutory 
Presumption in Federal Narcotics 
Prosecutions, 51 J. Crim. L. C. & P.S.7 
(1966); Comment, The Constitution-
ality of Statutory Criminal Presump-
tions, 34 U. Chi. J.,. Rev. 141 (1966). 
106 ·see, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 
513 (1958). 
107 See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 
U.S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States, 
395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States v, 
Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); Manley 
v. Georgia, 279 U.S. l (1929). 
108 United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 
67 (1965). 
109 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 
467-68 (1943) (footnotes omitted; 
·emphasis added). 
110 382 U.S. 136 (1965). 
Ill 380 U.S. 63 (1965). 
112 382 U.S. at 141. 
113 380 U.S. at 71. 
114 395 U.S. 6 (1969). In addition to the 
constitutional ground of decision 
discussed here, Leary also held that 
compliance with the registration 
provisions of the Marihuana Tax Act of 
1937 would violate the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. 395 
U.S. at 27. 
115 Id. at 36 (footnote omitted). An 
interesting question that would arise if a 
criminal presumption were held to be 
rational is whether the presumption 
must be established beyond a "reason-
able doubt" if the criminal charge or an 
essential element of it depended upon 
use of the presumption. 395 U.S. at 36 
n. 64. That question is still open. See 
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 
416 (1910);Butsee Lego v. Twomey, 
404 U.S. 477 (1972),(confession 
admissible if voluntary by preponder-
ance of evidence rather than reasonable 
doubt standard). 
116 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 38 
et seq. (1969). 
117 United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 
67 (1965). 
118 396 U.S .. 398 (1970). 
119 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 
(1957). 
120 Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 
(1928). 
121 Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 
178 (1925). For a provocative argument 
that America's anti-opium crusade was 
in large part an outgrowth of prejudice 
toward Orientals, see D. Musto, supra 
note 3, at 3-6 & n. 14. 
122 Federal law since 1909, the narcotics 
presumption was modelled on a section 
of the Smuggling Act of 1866. Turner v. 
United States, 396 U.S. 398, 408 & n. 9 
(1970). 
123 Id. at 416 (emphasis original). 
124 See N.Y. Times, March 25, 1973, § 1, 
at 58. 
125 See, e.g., Terry v, Ohio. 392 U.S. l 
(1968). 
126 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961) and its progeny. 
127 See, e.g., J. Creamer, The Law of 
A"est, Search and Seizure (1968). 
128 Not examined here are the important 
questions regarding the right of the 
State to detain a person involuntarily 
pending the completion of the drug 
examination. See Note, Detention to 
Obtain Physical Evidence Without 
Probable Cause: Proposed Rule 41.l of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 712 (1972); 
Note, Constitutional Limitations on the 
Taking of Body Evidence, 78 Yale L. J. 
1074 (1969). 
129 Savage & Robinson, Thin Layer 
Chromatography and the Management 
of Drug Abuse, 72 New Zealand Med. J. 
258 (Oct. 1972). 
130 At present, all arrestees in the District 
of Columbia undergo urinalysis shortly 
after arrest in an effort to detect drugs, 
particularly heroin. 
131 Leute, Ullman, & Goldstein, Spin 
I mmunoassrzy of Opiate Narcotics in 
Urine and Saliva, 221 J. Amer. Med. 
Ass'n 1231 (Sept. 11, 1972). 
132 Montalco et al., Flushing, Pale-Colored 
Urines, and False Negatives-Urinalysis 
of Narcotics Addicts, 7 Int'l J. 
Addictions 356 (1972). A recent 
federally sponsored year-long monitor-
ing of urinalysis done in laboratories 
used by government grantees and 
contractors found gross errors in testing 
results. Although the results have not 
yet been made public, they have been 
confirmed by the President's Special 
Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevel'l-
tion (SAODAP). Telephone call to 
SAODAP, April 20, 1973. 
133 Dole et al., Detection of Narcotic, 
Sedative, and Amphetamine Drugs in 
Urine, 72 N. Y. State J. Med. 471 (Feb. 
15, 1972). 
134 Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs Press Release, Sept. 19, 1972. 
135 Jaffe, "Narcotic Analgesics," in The 
Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics 
237, 249 (4th ed. L. Goodman & A. 
Gilman 1970). 
136 See note 98 supra. 
137 Sharpless, "Hypnotics and Sedatives," 
in The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeu· 
tics, supra note 41, at 11 l. 
138 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
139 Id. at 172. 
140 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (5-4 decision). 
141 E.g., United States v. Dionisio, 41 
U.S.L.W. 4180 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973) 
(voice exemplar); Gilbert v. California, 
388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting 
exemplar); United States v. D'Amico, 
408 F. 2d 331 (2d Cir. 1969) (clipping 
of a few strands of hair). See Davis v. 
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969) 
(question whether fingerprints can be 
taken absent probable cause under 
"narrowly circumscribed procedures" 
explicitly not reached). 
Another way of phrasing the question is 
to ask whether urinalysis falls within the 
constitutionally unprotected category of 
what "a person knowingly exposes to 
the public .... " Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
142 Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 
(1925). 
143 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 
(1962). Robinson was not without its 
harsh critics. See e.g., Packer, Mens Rea 
and the Supreme Court, 1962 S. Ct. 
Rev. 107, 147-48 n. 144 (1962). 
144 E.g., Dealing with Drug Abuse 36-38. 
Drug Use in America 242-56 persuasive-
ly argues that possession offenses make 
no sense on philosophical, constitution-
al, or functional grounds, but then 
rather inexplicably backs away from the 
logic of its own thoughtful work and 
opts for continued possession penalties 
(up to one year for a first offense under 
federal law) for all illegal drugs except 
marijuana, where no penalties should 
exist. Id. at 256. 
145 See Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 
F. 2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (en bane); 
Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F. 2d 761 (4th 
Cir. 1966). In Easter, supra at 60-61, the 
majority decision to absolve the 
alcoholic defendant of criminal 
responsibility was technically made on 
the basis of the existing District of 
17
Moore: Drugs and Crime: A Bad Connection?
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1973
245 
Columbia statute, not on more sweeping 
constitutional grounds. Driver, supra at 
764, concluded that a chronic alcoholic 
charged with public intoxication could 
not form the requisite criminal intent; 
he is a person whose presence in public 
" ... may be likened to the movements 
of an imbecile or a person in an delirium 
of a fever." 
146 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (5-4 decision). 
For discussions of the legal handling of 
alcoholism, see Merrill, Drunkenness and 
Reform of the Criminal Law, 54 Va. L. 
Rev. 1135 (1968); Stern, Handling 
Public Drunkenness: Reforms Despite 
Powell, 5 Int'l J. Addictions 155 (1970). 
147 Id. at 548-53. 
148 Id. at 532 .. 
149 Id. at 5.36. 
150 United States v. Moore, Docket No. 
71-1252 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 14, 1971) 
(en bane): Franklin v. United States, 
No. 5960 (D.C. Ct. of App. Feb. 27, 
1973) (three-judge decision vacated, 
rehearing en bane ordered, Feb. 27, 
1973). 
151 392 U.S. at 567. See generally Note, 
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause and the Substantive Criminal 
Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 635 (1966). 
152 317 F.2d 595 (D;C. Cir. 1963) 
(unsuccessful defense argument that the 
insanity defense covers the "pharmaco-
logical duress" of narcotic addiction 
without need to show separate evidence 
of mental illness). 
153 McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 
847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (insanity 
defense proper if, at time of act, accused 
suffered from some "mental disease or 
defect"). The latest formulation of the 
insanity defense by the District of 
Columbia Circuit is U.S. v. Brawner, 471 
F.2d 969 (D.C. Circ., 1972): cf. United 
States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d 
Cir. 1966) (adopting the "substantial 
capacity" standard of the AU Model 
Penal Code § 4.01 (1) (1962 Draft)). 
154 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 
862 (1954). See Bowman, Narcotic 
Addiction and Criminal Responsibility 
under Durham, 53 Geo. L.J. 1017 
(1965); Lowenstein, Addiction, Insanity 
and Due Process of Law: An Examina-
tion of the Capacity Defense, 3 Harv. 
Civ. Rights-Civ. lib. L. Rev. 125 
(1967). 
This line of attack would be largely 
foreclosed at the federal level if the 
insanity defense were virtually 
eliminated as a trial tool, as President 
Nixon has proposed. See S. 1400, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1973) (mental 
disease or defect a defense only to 
extent defendant "lacked the state of 
mind required as an element of the 
offense charged"); cf. Goldstein & Katz, 
Abolish the "Insanity Defense"- Why 
Not?, 72 Yale L.J. 873 (1963). 
155 No. 5960 (D.C. Ct. of App., Feb. 27, 
1973) (three-judge decision vacated, 
rehearing en bane ordered, Feb. 27, 
1973). 
156 Docket No. 71-1252 (D.C. Cir., filed 
Aug. 14, 1971) (en bane). 
157 See, e.g., R. King, The Drug Hang-Up: 
America's Fifty-Year Folly (1972) 
(passim); Baumgartner, Effect of Drugs 
on Criminal Responsibility, Specific 
Intent and Mental Competency, 8 Arn; 
Crim. L.Q. 118 (1970); Comment, 
Criminal Law: Demise of "Status-A ct" 
Distinction in Symptomatic Crimes of 
Narcotic Addiction, 1970 Duke L.J. 
1053 (1970); Comment, Emerging 
Rerognition of Pharmacological Duress 
as a Defense to the Possession of 
Narcotics, 59 Geo. L.J. 761 (1971); 
Note, Punishment of Narcotic Addicts 
for Possession: A Cruel But Unusual 
Punishment, 56 Iowa L. Rev. 578 
(1971). 
158 Brief for Appellant at 17, United 
States v. Moore Docket No. 71-1252 
(D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 14, 1971) (en 
bane). 
159 Id. at 4. 
160 See, e.g., Douglas, J., concurring in 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 
671 (1962) ("The addict is under 
compulsions not capable of management 
without outside help.") 
161 See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana 406 U.S. 
715 (1972); Chambers, Alternatives to 
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: 
Practical Guides and Constitutional 
Imperatives, 10 Mich. L. Rev. 1107 
(1972); Note, Civil Commitment of the 
Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 
79 Harv. L. Rev. 1288 (1966); Note, 
Civil Commitment of Narcotic Addicts, 
76 Yale L. J. 1160 (1967). 
The complicated subject of "mandatory 
treatment" of drug dependent persons is 
worthy of extended discussion. It is not 
explored here, except for the authors' 
belief that past efforts to cure involun-
tarily persons of undesirable traits, 
whether perceived mental problems, 
alcohol abuse, or drug addiction, have 
been largely unsuccessful. In the original 
three-judge opinion in Franklin v. 
United States. No. 5960 (D.C. Ct. of 
App. Feb. 27, 1973) (three-judge 
decision vacated, rehearing en bane 
ordered, Feb. 27, 1973), the majority 
noted that the Government could 
attempt to commit for treatment a 
person found not guilty of a crime by 
reason of drug dependence. Slip op. at 
43 & n. 58. 
162 Brief for Appellant, supra note 158, at 
113-16. 
163 See, e.g., People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 
310, 325, 411 P.2d 911, 919 (1966) 
(manslaughter instruction should have 
been given on murder charge where 
there was clear evidence that defendant 
was intoxicated on alcohol and other 
unspecified drugs). 
164 For a discussion of diminished capacity 
and policy justifications for criminal 
punishment (specific and general 
deterrence, isolation to protect society, 
retribution, rehabilitation), see 
Comment, A Punishment Rationale for 
Diminished Capacity, 18 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 561, 573 et. seq. (1971). 
165 Brief for Appellant, supra note 158, at 
70-71. 
166 See, e.g., Morris, Crimes Without 
Victims: The Law isa Busybody, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. l, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 
10-ll, 59-60. 
167 The California Supreme Court was able 
without much anguish to exempt Navajo 
members of the peyote-using Native 
American Church-an admittedly small 
and unique group-from the reach of 
drug possession laws. People v. Woody, 
61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813 (1964). 
Contra, State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 
219, 243 P. 1067 (1926). 
Even under Prohibition, only five states 
outlawed the private possession of 
alcohol for one's personal use. Drug Use 
in America 244 (Georgia, Idaho, 
Indiana, Kansas, and Tennessee). 
168 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to 
Pril/Qcy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). 
169 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 41 tJ.S.L.W. 
4213 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973) (abortion); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
(distribution of contraceptive devices); 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 
(1969) (obscene reading matter 
permitted in "privacy of one's own 
home"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967) (search and seizure); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) (contracepti"e devices). 
170 In Roe v. Wade, 41 U.S.L.W.: 4213, 
4225 (U.S. Jan. 22, .i.973) (abortion), 
the right to privacy was based upon the 
fourteenth amendment's "concept of 
personal liberty and restrictions upon 
state action." In Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), the 
Court found it in the "penumbras" and 
"emanations" emerging from the Bill of 
Rights. Justice Goldberg found it in the 
ninth amendment's admonition that 
"(t] he enumeration in the Constitution 
of certain rights, shall not be construed 
to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people." Id. at 488-94 (concuriing 
opinion). 
171 Roev. Wade,41 U.S.1.W.4213,4226 
(U.S. Jan. 22, 1973). 
172 The National Commission on 
Marihuana and Drug Abuse is acutely 
aware of the strong anti-liberalization 
stance of many present policy makers. 
The widespread rejection by political 
leaders of the Commission's recom-
mendation that possession penalties for 
cannabis use be eliminated "illustrates 
the difficulty of rearranging even a part 
of the structure." Drug Use in America 
256. 
173 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Two years after 
Stanley, the Court pointedly refused to 
expand Stanley's protection of free 
thought and privacy into a constitutior.-
al right to distribute obscene material. · 
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 
(1971). 
174 Id. at 568 n. 11. 
175 Id. at 566-67. 
176 Drug Use in America 23. 
177 Overzealousness is not unknown 
among law enforcers in the drug field. 
Only recently two innocent families 
were terrorized by federal narcotic 
agents who ransacked the wrong homes 
in an attempt to ferret out illicit drugs 
in a small Illinois town. N. Y. Times, 
Apr. 29, 1973, at 1. 
18
Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 3 [1973], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol3/iss3/1
